Posted by Estella on May 18, 2006, at 5:17:56
In reply to Re: opinion survey » Damos, posted by Estella on May 18, 2006, at 4:51:28
so we have:
1. cognition
2. bodily change
3. phenomenology (i'll use that for 'felt quality')nobody seemed particularly keen on cognition...
but lets imagine someone forms the judgement 'that object can hurt me'. on cognitive accounts of emotion (where those kinds of judgements are necessary and sufficient for emotion) the person will have an emotion on the basis of forming that judgement (or something comperable to it.
but it seems possible to think 'that object can hurt me' but to think this cooly and dispassionately. in this case most people seem to conclude that one does not have an emotion in response. hence emotions cannot be identified by cognitions (and cognitions cannot be a necessary and sufficient cause of emotion).
2. bodily change.
surely not just any old bodily change is relevant... there must be certain kinds of bodily changes that are particularly relevant for emotion. now if the theory is that certain kinds of bodily changes are necessary and sufficient for emotion then it would seem to be the case that people paralysed from the neck down cannot have emotions. does this seem plausible? (one could say that hormone and endocrine changes etc still occur and they are the relevant bodily changes for emotion thus paralysed people still have the relevant bodily changes and hence emotion... but i'm not sure how plausible this is...)
can we imagine the relevant bodily change (in the absence of cognitive judgement and in the absence of phenomenology?
for people who thought unconscious emotion was possible (in the sense that you might not be aware you are in an emotional state) this seems to be because people are thinking that bodily change is necessary and sufficient for emotion. maybe...
not sure what else to say...
but if phenomenology is the most central feature for emotion (as most people seem to want to say) then it seems possible to imagine someone having the bodily change in the absense of phenomenology (in the absence of being aware of the bodily change). is this person having an emotion or not? if bodily change is necessary and sufficient then yes. if phenomenology is necessary and sufficient then no.3. phenomenology.
it is possible to imagine someone having the phenomenological experience of fear without undergoing the relevant bodily changes and without having the relevant cognitions. at least... that seems to be so to me. at least... it seems to be possible in principle the same way that it seems possible in principle for someone to be a physical duplicate of me (down to the last atom) and yet have no phenomenological experiences whatsoever. that is a little controversial... but it seems to be conceptually possible...
James argued that if you imagine the phenomenology of fear... then subtract away the body changes... subtract away the racing heart the sweaty palms etc... then what you are left with is a cool cognitive state that isn't an emotion at all. he thinks that the phenomenology of emotions is comprised by the experience of the bodily changes (the racing heart and the sweaty palms etc).
while different theorists interpret him differently it seem to me that what he is saying is that....
the phenomenology of emotions JUST IS the bodily changes.
not that emotion causes body changes
not that body changes cause emotions
not that phenomenology causes body changes
not that body changes cause phenomenologyrather he is making the identity claim that the experience of emotions JUST IS ONE AND THE SAME THING as the experience of bodily changes.
this is comperable to materialism where the phenomenology of thinking JUST IS ONE AND THE SAME THING as the experience of certain kinds of brain state changes.
hrm.
but the problem with the identity theory (the theory that mental states just are certain kinds of brain state) is that we want to allow other organisms (martians or computers perhaps) to have mental states even though they lack brains like ours.. so long as they have states that play the same causal role as brain states (e.g. beliefs) play then they would have cognitive states.
comperably the problem with the identity theory (the theory that emotions are bodily states) is that we (might?) want to allow that other organisms (martians or computers perhaps) to have emotional states even though they lack bodies like ours. so long as they have states that play the same causal role as bodily states (e.g. emotions) play then they would have emotional states.
but then...
beliefs seem to be definable in accordance with their functional role (what seems to be essential about belief is that it plays its functional role)
emotions (on the other hand) seem to (according to most people) be phenomenological rather than functional. hence if you replicated the functional role without the phenomenology you wouldn't have an emotional state.hrm.
of course it might be the case that none of the above three features (by themself) are both necessary and sufficient for emotion. some emotions seem more cognitive (awe seems to be an emotion that is very cognitive and can't be experienced by animals or infants) others seem less phenomenological (does wonder count as an emotion? is there a phenomenology there?) others seem more bodily (burning rage or stomach churning disgust). it might be the case that emotions are a cluster concept and the search for necessary and sufficient conditions is futile.
still... best try and resort to cluster concept when alternatives fail...
poster:Estella
thread:645293
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/social/20060513/msgs/645406.html